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DEVOLUTION AND THE PARADOX OF
DEMOCRATIC UNRESPONSIVENESS
JAMES A. GARDNER*
Although the participants in the South Texas College of Law's
Symposium on Comparative Federalism in the Devolution Era
addressed a wide range of topics, one message came through loud and
clear: around the globe, many people are demanding, with some
frequency and with considerable success, that more and more
governmental power be exercised by smaller and smaller units of
government. In some cases (Czechoslovakia, Quebec), this demand
has taken the form of a demand for outright political independence.
In other cases (Tatarstan, KwaZulu/Natal), the demand has been one
for a greater degree of subnational power within a larger, more or less
federal system-a demand, that is to say, for devolution. The
panelists' accounts of these demands also brought home another
important point: for the most part, contemporary demands for
devolution have been justified by reference to some kind of right to
local or ethnic self-determination. Thus, even when demands for self-
determination fall short of demands for complete separation-when
they are demands for devolution rather than independence-they
typically draw upon the same stock of Romantic concepts of group
identity, and its reification in the political world, that have in this
century provided so much of the ideological infrastructure for
nationalist and separatist movements.! Power must be exercised by
subnational governments, in this account, because those governments
are the vehicles by which organic, subnational groups may fulfill their
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; B.A. 1980, Yale
University; J.D. 1984, University of Chicago. Thanks to Jim Rossi and Monte Piliawasky
for helpful comments and suggestions and to Bill Lambert for research assistance.
1. See LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY 8-11
(1992). The influence of Romantic ideas of nationalism is made apparent in works such as
WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING (1994);
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE
WORLD ORDER (1996); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS
INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (1993); WILLIAM PFAFF, THE WRATH OF NATIONS:
CIVILIZATION AND THE FURIES OF NATIONALISM (1993); and ANTHONY D. SMITH,
NATIONAL IDENTITY (1991).
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historical destiny to act collectively on the world stage.2
This tendency to justify devolution in nationalist terms stands in
considerable contrast to the justifications for devolution typically
advanced in the United States. Here, too, many have called for the
transfer to the state level of powers now exercised by the national
government. Yet devolution's proponents in this country typically
defend it in very different terms, terms that are functional rather thau
ideological. Most commonly, devolution in this country is defended
on the instrumental ground that it makes government more
responsive to the popular will, thereby enhancing popular control
over government and strengthening democracy. This claim in turn
depends upon the belief, commonplace in American constitutional
jurisprudence, that state governments are more democratically
responsive than the national government In the American account,
then, a power that may constitutionally be exercised at either the state
or national levels is usually better exercised by state governments
because they are simply more likely than the federal government to
do what the people want.
This paper, attempts to balance the account of devolution
presented at the Symposium by exploring the functional, democratic
justification for devolution that dominates the issue in American
politics. One of the most striking features of the constitutions of the
American states is the extent to which they include far more
numerous mechanisms of direct popular control than does the United
States Constitution. The question I shall address is whether state
2. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 38-
47 (J. Sibree trans., Dover 1956).
3. The claim that state governments are more democratically responsive than the
national government is sometimes meant in two distinct ways. First, the exercise of power
on the state level is sometimes said to be more responsive because it better accommodates
heterogeneity. Policy preferences often differ from region to region and state to state.
While summing individual policy preferences nationwide should produce a policy that is
preferred by a national majority, summing and implementing policy preferences state by
state may be even more responsive by allowing an even greater number of people to be
governed by policies that they prefer, thereby increasing overall social utility. See generally
FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-94 (1987).
Second, a state government is sometimes said to be more responsive than the national
government because state governments are simply more likely to do what the people want.
On this view, state governments are, for some set of institutional reasons, more
democratic-more responsive to the will of the relevant polity-than is the national
government. These two claims are of course related: the exercise of power on the state
level is unlikely to better accommodate heterogeneous policy preferences across state
polities unless state governments are at least as responsive to state polities as the federal
government is to the national polity.
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constitutions, by virtue of their employment of far stronger and more
numerous mechanisms of popular control, have succeeded in making
state government more democratically responsive than the United
States Constitution makes the national government. This inquiry in
turn may provide some basis for judging whether the policies of
devolution urged in the United States can be adequately justified in
the terms in which they are typically defended.
Part I of this paper examines the federal Constitution in light of
the assumptions concerning governmental responsiveness that guided
its drafters, and then presents an overview of the contrasting
mechanisms of democratic responsiveness found in state constitutions.
Part II examines the differences between the federal and state
constitutional approaches to democratic responsiveness to determine
whether they can be explained by differing philosophical assumptions
about governance. I conclude that the differences cannot be so
explained. Part III turns to the question of whether state constitutions
have succeeded in making state governments more democratically
responsive than the federal government. Drawing on some recent
work by political scientists, Part III suggests that state constitutional
mechanisms of democratic control do not make state governments
more responsive to the popular will than the federal government, but
that they probably make state governments responsive to different
kinds of influences. Part III also presents the paradox of democratic
unresponsiveness: the more seriously democratic governments take
their obligation to respond to the majority will, the less responsive
they become. Finally, Part IV briefly explores some possible
resolutions of the paradox of democratic unresponsiveness.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS OF POPULAR CONTROL
A fundamental prerequisite to the legitimacy of democratic
regimes is responsiveness to the popular will. Democracy, like other
forms of popular sovereignty, is a species of self-rule; and self-rule,
unlike submission to the rule of others, presupposes governance in
accordance with the wishes of the governed. Maintaining
governmental responsiveness has accordingly been a preoccupation of
contemporary democratic regimes, and never more so than in the
contemporary United States; political philosopher Michael Sandel
calls the fear of loss of self-government one of the defining anxieties
of our age.4
4. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 3 (1996).
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Among the legacies that the American founding generation
bequeathed to its successors is the conviction that the goals for which
government is established can best be achieved through careful
institutional design. The Framers of the United States Constitution
believed themselves engaged in the experiment of determining
"whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are
forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident
and force. 5 The United States Constitution was the product of this
political experiment in reflection and choice. Consequently, in this
country the question of how best to assure governmental
responsiveness is often cast as a question of constitutional structure.
Since the first American Constitutions were drafted in 1776,
constitutional architects have devised a great variety of institutional
mechanisms to keep American governments responsive to the wishes
of their constituents. The two most prominent, of course, are the
election of legislative representatives, a feature of every American
constitution, and mechanisms of direct democracy such as initiatives
and referenda, found in some state constitutions. Yet to these must
be added many other devices such as term limits, rotation in office,
recall of sitting officials, the election of judicial and lower executive
branch officials, and many others.
The great majority of these institutional mechanisms for the
preservation and enhancement of governmental responsiveness
appear exclusively in the constitutions of the states, a hardly surprising
result. State constitutions are generally easier to amend than the
federal Constitution,6 and the lesser veneration in which they are held
has sometimes made state polities more willing to experiment in the
field of constitutional design. Moreover, states have been admitted to
the Union throughout our history, meaning that their constitutions
have been drafted under the influence of political and philosophical
assumptions that may have differed from those of the eighteenth-
century drafters of the first generation of American constitutions. For
example, many state constitutions were either drafted or significantly
amended under the powerful influence of the good government
assumptions of early twentieth-century Progressivism. The
constitutionalization of initiatives and referenda, for example, can be
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
6. An influential early critique of the ease of state constitutional amendment is
Note, California's Constitutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. REv. 279 (1949).
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traced largely to this period.7
The purpose of these state constitutional changes was obviously
to make state government more democratically responsive. Has this
occurred? A useful way to begin answering this question is to take a
closer look at the various means constitutional architects have devised
to maintain the democratic responsiveness of government institutions.
A. The Unresponsive National Constitution
The United States is usually referred to colloquially as a
democracy. In fact, the federal Constitution creates a republican form
of government with surprisingly few democratic features. As Madison
candidly explained, the federal Constitution is characterized by a
"total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity" from the
reins of government.' Instead, the most democratic feature of the
original Constitution was the establishment of popular elections for
Representatives.9 Until ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment,
Senators were elected by state legislatures rather than popularly. °
The Constitution mandates no popular role in presidential elections:
not only is the President elected by the Electoral College, but the
Constitution leaves the manner of selecting electors to the state
legislatures." The contemporary practice of popular election to the
Electoral College is thus a matter of legislative grace rather than
constitutional entitlement.
Federal judges at all levels are, of course, appointed by the
President, as are all executive branch officials. There is no provision
in the federal Constitution for any mechanism of direct democracy
such as the initiative or referendum, nor even for any kind of
nonbinding plebiscite. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the
United States Constitution does not establish any substantive
constitutional right to vote-not even for offices required by the
Constitution to be filled by popular election: "The Constitution," as
the Court has often said, "does not confer the right of suffrage upon
any one."' 3 Similarly, the Constitution in the Court's view does not
7. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
10. Id., art. I, § 2.
11. Id., art.iI, § 1, cl. 2.
12. See id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
13. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874); accord Rodriguez v. Popular
Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973).
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establish any right to run for or hold public office.'4 Finally, although
the Constitution seems explicitly to forbid the establishment within a
state of an overtly monarchical or aristocratic form of government, 5
the Court has for a century and a half held the much more pertinent
constitutional guarantee of republican government" to be judicially
unenforceable under the political question doctrine."
These features of the United States Constitution result from a
deliberate choice by the Framers to create a document that was
undemocratic. Like the ancient Greeks, the Framers feared
democracy, associating it with instability and the rule of the mob.
"Democracies," wrote Madison, "have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with
personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as
short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."'' 8 The
critical flaw in democracy, the framers believed, lay in its susceptibility
to faction, and particularly to majority faction, which Madison
identified as the single most important problem against which
constitutional designers must guard. 9 In consequence, the framers
deliberately structured the federal Constitution to impede the
coalescence of majority factions, and, in the event such factions
managed to appear, to contain their effects. The Constitution
accordingly establishes a large republic, divides power among the
branches of government, and divides it further among state and
national governments in a federal system.
The idea that majority faction could be a serious problem for a
self-governing populace is an incongruous one in a society dedicated
to the principle of popular sovereignty. Madison defined a faction as
14. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) (applying rational basis scrutiny
to restrictions on candidates' ability to run for office); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143
(1972) (holding barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot do not require strict scrutiny).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, & § 10, cl. 1.
16. The Guarantee Clause provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .. " Id., art. IV, § 4.
17. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. 34 (1849). But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-85 (1992); Minor
v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175-76 (1874). The Court's position has been forcefully
criticized. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 260 n.118 (1980)
(criticizing Court's generalization of holding in Luther to all invocations of claims under
the clause as "rooted in a category mistake" and "a gross mistake of logic"); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 849 (1994).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
19. Id. at 80.
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"a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community."2° But if a
faction is a group opposed to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community-opposed that is, to pursuit of the common good-
how can it be said that a majority of citizens could ever amount to a
faction? Surely it must be more correct to say that the wishes or
interests of the majority define the common good.
The main reason why the notion of a majority faction did not
strike the Framers as contradictory is that they believed in an
objectively defined common good, one that simply did not vary with
the changing understandings of a majority of the citizenry. This
should not surprise us. The founding generation, after all, grew up
under the influence of a rationalist epistemology according to which
moral truths, including the nature of the common good, were fixed,
objective, and capable of discovery through the use of proper
reasoning." Nowhere has this philosophy been more succinctly
capsulized than in the assertion that "We hold these truths to be self-
evident."' 2
In light of these views, it is clear why the framers of the federal
Constitution had little interest in creating a democratically responsive
document. The kind of responsiveness in which they were primarily
interested was responsiveness to the objectively knowable common
good rather than responsiveness to the will of the populace. Indeed,
democratic responsiveness was more likely to constitute a problem to
be overcome than a solution to be welcomed. As a result, the
Constitution is filled with provisions that impede its responsiveness-
for example, bicameralism, the presidential veto, judicial review, six-
year senatorial terms, life tenure for judges, and so on.' The federal
Constitution thus creates a government that is, if not democratically
unresponsive, at least incompletely responsive to the popular will.
B. State Constitutional Pursuit of Democratic Responsiveness
Even the briefest glance at the constitutions of the various
20. Id. at 78.
21. See, e.g., MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 20-21,217 (1987).
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also WHITE,
supra note 21, at 9-60.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2,3; art. I, § 7, cl. 2; art. III, § 2; art. I, § 3, cl. 1; art. III, § 1.
1999]
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American states suggests numerous reasons to think that state
governments might be far more responsive to the popular will than
the federal government: state constitutions contain far more
mechanisms of democratic control than the federal Constitution.
Undoubtedly the most widely known of these institutions are the
initiative and referendum, state constitutional provisions that establish
a form of direct democracy by authorizing the people to bypass the
legislature and, through direct collective action, amend the state
constitution or enact legislation. Yet initiatives and referenda
represent only the tip of the iceberg-in fact, state constitutions are
filled with a wide variety of mechanisms designed to increase the
democratic accountability of state governments.
First, unlike the United States Constitution, the constitution of
every state contains an affirmative grant of the franchise.24 These
franchise provisions, moreover, are generally held by state courts to
give rise to a judicially enforceable substantive right to vote in state
and federal elections.25  In many states, the right to vote is
supplemented by its logical corollary, a constitutionally guaranteed
right to run for office.26 State constitutions also provide many more
opportunities to exercise this right to vote: all but four provide for
independent popular election of lower executive branch officials such
as the state's attorney general or chief financial officer,27 and many
provide for popular election to numerous executive offices, up to as
many as ten.' In addition, the constitutions of 42 states provide for
popular election of at least some state judges.29 Popular control of
24. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1; GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, II; HAW. CONST.
art. II, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 1;
OR. CONST. art. II, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 2.
25. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 330 A.2d 774, 775 (N.H. 1974) (holding that
infringements of state constitutional right to vote are subject to strict scrutiny); Smith v.
Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 353 (N.J. 1979) (same). Some states recognize a substantive right to
vote guaranteed by the state constitution, but accord it protection only at the rational basis
level. See, e.g., Allen v. Merrell, 305 P.2d 490, 491 (Utah 1956), vacated on other grounds,
353 U.S. 932 (1957).
26. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 594 (Mass. 1983);
Elbers v. Growe, 502 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Minn. 1993); State ex rel. Sowards v. County
Comm'n, 474 S.E.2d 919, 925 (W. Va. 1996).
27. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 33-34
(1996-1997). The exceptions are Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Tennessee.
28. For example, in North Carolina and North Dakota the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Treasurer, Auditor, and Commissioners
of Education, Agriculture, Labor and Insurance are all elected. Id.
29. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152; ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6; ARIZ. CONST.
art. VI, § 12; ARK. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6, 17; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16; COLO. CONST. art.
VI, § 25; CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10; GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7;
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state officials, however, is not confined to electing them but often
extends to getting rid of them as well. For example, the constitutions
of twelve states provide for popular recall of sitting officials. ° At least
eighteen states constitutionally impose term limits on at least some
elected officials, principally legislators.31 Twenty-six states establish
mandatory rotation in office by disqualifying their governors from
succeeding themselves. 2
The constitutions of many states also enhance the responsiveness
of state government through a variety of regulatory measures.
Twenty-eight state constitutions explicitly require that elections be
"free," "equal," "fair" or "open," 33 a potentially powerful but
IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12; IND. CONST. art. VII, § 11; IOWA
CONST. art. V, § 17; KAN. CONST. art. III, § 5; KY. CONST. § 117; LA. CONsT. art. V, § 22;
ME. CONST. art. VI, § 6; MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. VI §§ 2, 8, 12; MINN.
CONST. art. VI, § 7; MIss. CONST. art. VI, § 145; MO. CONST. art. V, § 17; MONT. CONST.
art. VII, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21 (3); NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. VI, §
4; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 610; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9; N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3; OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art.
V, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TEx. CONST. art. V, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9;
VT. CONST. ch. II, § 50; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 2, 5; Wis.
CONST. art. VII, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(g).
30. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 8; ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; CAL. CONST.
art. II, §§ 13-19; COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 6; KAN. CONST. art.
IV, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 8; NEV. CONST. art. II, § 9; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 10; OR.
CONST. art. II, § 18; R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 33.
31. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 73; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Legislative), art. V, §
2 (Executive); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 3 (Legislative); DEL. CONST. art III, § 5; FLA.
CONST. art VI, § 4; HAW. CONST. art. V, § 1; LA. CONST. art. III, § 4 (Legislative), art. IV,
§ 3 (Executive); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 54 (Legislative), art. V, § 30 (Executive); Miss.
CONST. art V, § 116 (Executive); MO. CONST. art. III, § 8 (Legislative), art. IV, § 17
(Executive); MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (Legislative, Executive); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 8
(Legislative), art. XV, §§ 19, 20; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (Legislative), art. V, § 3
(Executive); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 12 (Treasurer); OHIO CONST. art. II, § 2 (Legislative),
art. V, § 8 (Executive); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 17(a); OR. CONST. art. II, § 19; S.D.
CONST. art. III, § 6 (Legislative).
32. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 282; ALASKA CONST. art III, § 5; ARIZ. CONST.
art. V, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2; GA. CONST. art. V, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. V, §
1; IND. CONST. art. V, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 1; KY. CONST. § 71; M.R.S.A. CONST. art.
V, Pt. 1, § 2; MD. CONST. art. II, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 8;
N.J. CONST. art. V, § 5; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 2; OHIO CONST.
art. III, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; OR. CONST. art. V, § 1; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 3; R.I.
CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; TENN. CONST. art.
III, § 4; VA. CONST. art. V, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
33. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 21 ("Elections shall be free and equal"); ARK.
CONST. art. III, § 2 ("free and equal"); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("free, fair, and open");
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 5 ("free and open"); DEL. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("free and equal");
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("free and equal"); IND. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("free and equal"); KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 6 ("free and equal"); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. VII
("free and frequent"); MASS. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art IX ("free"); Miss. CONST.
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generally underutilized form of protection for the integrity of
elections. The constitutions of sixteen states authorize the people to
"instruct" their representatives, 35 another largely underutilized set of
provisions that state courts have tended to interpret weakly.36 Finally,
a few state courts have even rejected the application of the political
question doctrine to the Guarantee Clause of the United States
Constitution, and have held that the federal Constitution imposes on
states an affirmative obligation to maintain certain minimal levels of
democratic control through electoral devices. 7
If constitutionally established mechanisms of popular control
such as these are at all capable of making a government
democratically responsive, then there should be no doubt that state
governments are, as proponents of devolution contend, more
responsive than the national government. Is this the case? Before
turning to an evaluation of governmental responsiveness, it will be
useful to consider some of the reasons why the state and federal
constitutions seem to take such different approaches to the
construction and maintenance of democratic responsiveness.
II. THE REASONS FOR STATE PURSUIT OF ENHANCED
RESPONSIVENESS
In adopting a plethora of devices designed to enhance the
democratic responsiveness of state government, state constitutions
clearly reject the approach taken by the United States Constitution.
art. XII, § 247 ("fairness in"); MO. CONST. art. I, § 25 ("free and open"); MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 13 ("free and open"); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("free"); N.H. CONST. art. I, § 11
("free"); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("free and open"); N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10 ("free and
frequent"); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 5 ("free and equal"); OR. CONST. art II, § 1 ("free and
equal"); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("free and open"); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9 ("free and
equal"); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("free and equal"); UTAH CONST. art I, § 17 ("free"); VT.
CONST. ch. II, § 55 ("free and pure"); VA. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("free"); WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 19 ("free and equal"); Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 27 ("free and equal").
34. See generally Matthew C. Jones, Fraud and the Franchise: The Pennsylvania
Constitution's "Free and Equal Election" Clause as an Independent Basis for State and
Local Election Challenges, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1473 (1995).
35. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, §
10; IND. CONST. art. I, § 31; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; ME. CONST. art. I, § 15;
MASS. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 19; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. I,
§ 10; N.H. CONST. art. I, § 32; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 3; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 26; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 23; VT. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XX;
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
36. See generally Fuller v. Haines, 112 N.E. 873 (Mass. 1916).
37. See generally Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223 (Kan. 1973); In re Initiative
Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1990); Heimerl v. Ozaukee City, 40 N.W.2d 564 (Wis.
1949).
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Why? Several possibilities come to mind.
First, it may be that state constitutions reflect a belief in a
subjective common good-one that is defined by the beliefs of the
majority-and a concomitant rejection of the concept of an objective
common good as the framers of the United States Constitution
understood it. Second, state constitutions might retain an underlying
belief in an objective common good, but reflect instead a lack of faith
in state officials that far exceeds any reservations the federal framers
might have had about federal officials. This lack of faith might take
two forms. First, state constitutions might reflect a lack of faith in the
ability of state officials to perceive the common good, or at least a
belief that state officials are less able to perceive the common good
than is the general public, thereby necessitating constitutional
mechanisms that heighten the democratic responsiveness of state
government. Alternatively, state constitutions might reflect a lack of
faith, not in the ability of state officials to perceive the common good,
but in their willingness to pursue it. That is, state officers know what
they ought to do, but for some reason fail to do it. In my view, the last
of these possibilities comes closest to the truth.
A. The Belief in an Objective Common Good
There is no particular reason to think that those who drafted and
ratified state constitutions were any more inclined than the framers of
the federal Constitution to embrace a subjective conception of the
common good. First, not only were the earliest state constitutions
contemporaneous with the federal Constitution, and thus likely to
reflect similar philosophical assumptions, but many of them were
actually drafted by some of the same individuals who wrote the
federal document." These early constitutions exercised a tremendous
influence over the drafting of constitutions for states later admitted to
the Union, providing models and, in many cases, actual language."
Moreover, several of these early constitutions are still in force,
presumably continuing to reflect the assumptions under which they
38. For example, George Mason was the "chief architect" of the 1776 Virginia
Constitution; see A.E. DICK HOWARD, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
VIRGINIA 7 (1974); and Benjamin Franklin was a delegate to the 1776 Pennsylvania
constitutional convention. See J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF
1776 136 (1936).
39. See generally Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade:
Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism,
62 TEMP. L. REV. 541 (1989).
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were drafted. '
Second, American state constitutions universally contain many of
the same democratically unresponsive institutions contained in the
United States Constitution. Every state constitution provides for a
bill of rights, judicial review, a gubernatorial veto, and the separation
of powers, and all but one provides for a bicameral legislature.4' State
constitutions even contain undemocratic features not found in the
federal Constitution such as grants to courts of authority to establish
rules of common law. 2 Thus, state constitutions do not reflect an
unlimited embrace of the results of pure majoritarianism.
Third and most importantly, every state without exception
utilizes electoral mechanisms that "overreward" political success. On
any political or electoral issue, the electorate is likely to be divided.
Yet in American elections this division is rarely reflected with much
accuracy, if at all, once the votes are aggregated for the purpose of
determining who is entitled to hold office. 43 This is due primarily to
the nature of the electoral systems adopted by the states.44 For
example, under the winner-take-all system, a party whose candidates
each receive 51 percent of the relevant popular vote may in theory
occupy 100 percent of the available offices. This tendency is even
more pronounced in jurisdictions that use a "first-past-the-post"
system, in which an office may be awarded to the candidate who
receives the largest plurality of votes. The use of single-member
districts, in which the polity represented by a multimember body such
as a legislature is divided up into small districts each entitled to elect a
single representative, also increases the degree to which electoral
success is overrewarded in the ultimate results.45
40. For example, the original constitutions of Massachusetts (1780) and Vermont
(1784) are still in force.
41. The exception is Nebraska. See NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1.
42. See generally Judith S. Kaye, Forward: The Common Law and State Constitutional
Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 727 (1992).
43. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About
Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1712-15 (1993) (discussing aggregation phase of voting
process); Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of
Proportional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 227, 266-67
(1985) (stating winner-take-all single-member districting "assures that one group, the
winning coalition of subgroups constituting the majority, will gain everything and the other
groups nothing").
44. Although Congress has the power to prescribe election codes for federal
elections, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, it has for the most part left the regulation of federal
elections to the states.
45. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 71-118 (1994);
Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 205; Levinson, supra note 43, at 266-67.
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These systems are sometimes harshly criticized, with some justice,
for submerging minority views. 6 Yet critics often miss their mark by
failing to engage the practice of electoral overrepresentation at the
level of its own justifications. The American tradition of political
thought discussed earlier suggests ready reasons why electoral
overrepresentation might be thought to be a natural and desirable
feature of an electoral system. These justifications depend on a belief
in an objective common good.
Electoral mechanisms that overreward political success share one
feature in common: they presuppose the inevitability, or at least the
desirability, of a unified polity. A government that lacks a dominant
majority may find it difficult to act decisively or consistently, and may
find itself prone to reversals or inconsistencies when it is unable
regularly to command a majority on contested issues. A polity that
selects, from among the available alternatives, an electoral system that
overrewards political success surely does so for the purpose of
assuring, as much as possible, that the society moves along a single,
coherent course.47 The belief that it is desirable for a society to pursue
a single, consistent course in turn reflects the commonplace
assumption that the purpose of politics is to discover the common
good and to achieve it through concerted social action.4' Yet by
definition there can be only one common good. It follows that
whenever, after a political contest, a society has settled upon the
content of the common good, there can be little reason to do anything
other than pursue it as efficiently and aggressively as possible. That is
46. GUINIER, supra note 45, chs. 3-5; Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The
Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 173, 174 (1989); Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices
and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991).
47. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1350 (1987) (arguing that a polity might
want to give electoral winners a "victory bonus" to "promote effective governance in a
markedly decentralized political systems that always skirts the dangers of excessive
fragmentation and destabilizing fluidity"). Rae calls this "defractionalization" and claims
that it is designed to produce "an effective flow of public policy." DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 136 (1967). Another purpose of
overrewarding political success may be to emphasize social unity through symbolic means.
Thus, a polity's designation of a single executive rather than an executive council reifies
the unity of the people at whose head the executive sits. Election of a single legislator
from a single district likewise treats the people of the district as united behind their choice.
48. This is a belief that goes back in Western thought at least as far as the ancient
Greeks. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 1278b, 1283b (Ernest Barker
ed. & trans., Oxford 1946). As Locke later put it, "the power of the society, or legislative
constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good ......
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT at 73 (Thomas P. Peardon, ed. 1952).
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precisely what political overrepresentation is intended to facilitate.
Critics of electoral overrepresentation often argue that it
amounts to an unwarranted usurpation of power by a bare majority. 9
While this view has certain obvious merits, it is based on pluralist
assumptions very different from the ones I have been describing.
What, after all, is a political contest? To say that electoral
overrepresentation usurps power is implicitly to understand politics as
a struggle for control over the levers of power. Overrepresentation
may thus amount to usurpation because it involves ignoring or
suppressing the views and interests of a political minority. This
suppression is sometimes said to be doubly bad: not only does it
marginalize members of political minorities by denying them a voice
in the shaping of public policy, but it also creates a false appearance of
social unity by papering over the reality of a society riven by contests
over political truth."
But the assumptions underlying American constitutional regimes
of electoral overrepresentation are altogether different. Under
American constitutions, political contests do not rest on the idea that
political truths are contestable, and that the purpose of elections is
therefore to marshal power so as to propel one particular subjective
truth temporarily to primacy. Rather, political contests in the
American tradition rest more on a kind of Jeffersonian epistemology
holding simply that the majority is more likely than the minority to
have correctly perceived the objectively defined common good." A
49. This is the central argument of GUINIER, supra note 45; see also DOUGLAS J.
AMY, REAL CHOICE/NEW VOICES: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 1 (1993) (arguing that the single-member plurality
system denies representation altogether to those who vote for the losers); Andrea
Bierstein, Millenium Approaches: The Future of the Voting Rights Act After Shaw,
DeGrandy, and Holder, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1457, 1482-83 (1995) (making similar
argument).
50. GUINIER, supra note 45, ch. 5; see also Alan Howard & Bruce Howard, The
Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1654 (1983) (explaining that the Voting Rights Act's provisions to
guarantee safe districts to racial minorities "simulates a discrimination-free result but at a
considerable cost to the fairness and integrity of the political process").
51. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 40 (Harvard 1989); ADRIENNE KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 20, 118, 149-50, 153 (Quadrangle 1943); DAVID N. MAYER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 103-04 (U. Virginia 1994);
MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 136-41 (Oxford
1978). A belief in the wisdom of majority rule need not, of course, rest on epistemological
grounds. Like the Framers, the Progressives, for example, believed that institutions could
be pragmatically structured to achieve good rule through majoritarian institutions. Thus,
the contemporary preference for single-member districts derives in part from
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democratic election thus represents nothing more than an opportunity
for society's members to put their heads together and attempt to
identify the common good. In a society that professes a Jeffersonian
faith in the collective wisdom of the common people, there is nothing
for any reasonable person to do following an election except yield
graciously to the superior wisdom of the majority-in Jefferson's
words, to "bow down to the general reason of the society."52
The adoption in a jurisdiction of truly responsive electoral
institutions such as proportional representation would tell a different
tale. Proportional representation and allied systems tend to impugn
the notion of an objective common good by treating the polity as
disaggregated and plural, and then institutionalizing this plurality in a
lasting way-for example, by establishing a form of parliamentary rule
that depends upon coalition-building. This kind of institutional
recognition of political disaggregation lends credence to the possibility
of deeply contested political truths, and thus to the likelihood of a
common good that is merely subjective. The fact that no state has
ever adopted such a system or even, so far as I am aware, given it
serious consideration,53 is further evidence that state constitutions, like
the federal Constitution, rest on a conception of an objective common
good.
B. Lack of Faith in State Officials
If state constitutions do not provide for greater democratic
responsiveness because they reflect an underlying belief in a
subjective common good, then we need to explore the possibility that
they do so because they reflect instead an underlying lack of faith in
state officials. To begin with, I see no evidence that state officials are,
or are thought to be, less capable than federal officials of perceiving
the common good. It is especially hard to see why this might be the
case given that the vast majority of federal office holders start their
Progressivism's "median preference theory of representation." According to this theory,
representatives elected from large, heterogeneous single-member districts will be forced to
respond to the median political position of the district's voters, thereby minimizing the
possibility that representatives will be elected who will respond to and pursue politically
extreme or narrow-interest positions-that is, those that are unwise or contrary to the
common good. See BRUCE CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 65 (1984).
52. MAYER, supra note 51, at 103.
53. According to one recent study, experience with proportional representation in
the United States is limited to the municipal level. See AMY, supra note 49, at 10-11.
Interestingly, the 1924 Model Constitution, drafted by a convention of Progressive
reformers, proposed a unicameral legislature and proportional representation. See
generally NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, A MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION (1924).
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political careers on the state and local levels.' If anything, the
popular assumption today seems to be that moving from state capitals
to Washington makes officials dumber rather than the other way
around. If state constitutions, then, reflect a lack of faith in state
officials, it appears to be a lack of faith not in their ability to perceive
the common good, but in their willingness to pursue it.
This view finds significant support in the historic evolution of
state constitutions. In the early days of the republic, state
constitutions generally resembled the United States Constitution: they
tended to be short, to limit their subject.matter to what Marshall
called the "great outlines"5 of government power, and to delegate
substantial amounts of unrestricted power to the political branches."
With the exception of the oldest state constitutions still in force, state
constitutions today tend to look distinctly different from the federal
model. They are lengthy, go into considerable detail in many areas of
law, and contain numerous restrictions concerning the mechanics of
governmental administration. 7
A striking number of the most typical state constitutional
innovations represent deliberate public responses to specific acts of
governmental malfeasance. For example, many state constitutions
sharply restrict the state's ability to incur debt. These restrictions date
mostly from the middle third of the nineteenth century, and were
adopted in response to a series of disastrous public works
expenditures on canals and railroads that caused serious financial
difficulty for numerous states. Many state constitutions require that
the title of a bill accurately reflect its subject. These provisions grew
out of the infamous Yazoo scandal of 1795, in which the Georgia state
legislature enacted a law whose innocuous title did not accurately
reflect the fact that the law's main purpose was to sell public lands to
private speculators at an unconscionably low price."
54. JESSE H. 'CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
178 (1980).
55. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,407 (1819).
56. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. (1780); N.Y. CONST. (1776); S.C. CONST. (1776); VA.
CONST. (1776).
57. See generally Albert L. Sturm, The Development of State Constitutions, 12
PUBLIUS 57 (1982).
58. See Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative
Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV.
1301, 1306-10 (1991).
59. See Millard H. Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject," 42
MINN. L. Rev. 389, 391-92 (1958). Interestingly, although such constitutional provisions
seem designed to prevent legislators from being misled during hasty sessions, a more
accurate title would not likely have changed the outcome of the Yazoo scandal itself:
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This linkage between governmental malfeasance and
constitutional reform was especially pronounced during the
Progressive Era. Influenced by the earlier agrarian Populist
movement with which it merged,6° Progressivism responded to broad-
based and deeply felt beliefs that much of substance was wrong with
the country; that a main source of its problems was an unjust status
quo that benefited the wealthy and entrenched at the expense of the
common citizen; that government had the ability and responsibility to
intervene and improve the lot of the disadvantaged majority; and that
government had thus far refused to take the necessary actions because
it had become dominated by, and had come to serve, the very
entrenched and privileged interests responsible for the nation's ills.6'
In the words of Benjamin Parke De Witt, an early historian of the
Progressive movement, its purpose was to oppose "the control of
government by special interests and the prostitution of government to
serve the needs of a small minority."62  Progressives fought this
domination by waging largely successful campaigns for reforms such
as expanded suffrage, secret ballots, direct primaries, initiatives,
referenda, recall, campaign finance disclosure, and easier
constitutional amendment, among others, many of which were
eventually implemented at the constitutional level.63 The purpose of
these reforms was, according to the Progressives themselves, "to
dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt
politics"' by giving "a majority of the people ... an easy, direct, and
certain control over their government."65
according to one historian, "only one of the legislators voting for [the bill to sell public
lands] had not been bribed in some way by the land companies." C. PETER MAGRATH,
YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK 7
(Brown University Press 1966).
60. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 133
(Vintage 1955).
61. See generally id. at 131-212; BENJAMIN PARKE DE WITr, THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT (U. of Wash. Press 1968) (1915); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER 1877-1920, chs. 2-7 (Hill & Wang 1967).
62. DE WITr, supra note 61, at 46.
63. See, e.g., DE WITT, supra note 61, chs. 10-11; The Progressive Party Platform of
1912, reprinted in RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1900-1915, at
129 (1963); William Allen White, The Old Order Changeth, reprinted in RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1900-1915, at 133-36 (1963);
64. Progressive Party Platform of 1912, supra note 63, at 128.
65. DE WITr, supra note 61, at 196.
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III. Is DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS POSSIBLE?
It thus appears that state constitutions evince an underlying belief
that state officials are not sufficiently willing to pursue what they,
along with society generally, know to be the common good. Assuming
this proposition to be true, why should it be so? This question raises
some vexing issues concerning the nature and sources of
governmental responsiveness to the popular will.
A. Factions in State Government
Madison surely would not have been surprised to find that state
governments are less willing than the federal government to pursue
the common good. According to Madison this is precisely what we
ought to expect in light of the heightened responsiveness of the states.
Their small size and greater proximity to the people, Madison
believed, make state governments highly responsive.' Yet these very
features also vastly increase the likelihood that the responsiveness of
state governments will amount in practice to responsiveness to
factions, which by definition do not seek the common good. 7 If this is
correct, then state constitutions, for all the many ways in which they
differ from the federal Constitution, are actually in substantial
philosophical agreement with it. On the federal level, the nation's
great size and the separation of powers are sufficient checks against
the evils of majority faction. The much smaller states, on the other
hand, are far more susceptible to this problem:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties
and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of
the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which
they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute
their plans of oppression.6
State constitutions, on this view, provide greater opportunities for
democratic control than does the federal Constitution principally to
guard against the possibility that the reins of government will be
seized by factions."
66. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961; THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295-97 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 119-20 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961.
67. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
68. Id. at 83.
69. Interestingly, the Progressives believed that the Madisonian emphasis on size and
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This view of the matter, however, presents an interesting chicken-
and-egg problem: are state governments more responsive to faction
because they offer more opportunities for democratic control, or do
they offer those opportunities because they are more responsive? Is
democratic control, then, the problem or the cure? One might be
tempted to say that because most state constitutional mechanisms
enhancing popular control are of comparatively recent vintage they
should be understood as cures, yet the truth is more complex. First,
the Framers thought state governments to be more responsive than
the proposed federal government, and thus more susceptible to
faction, well before any of the modern institutions of democratic
control were in place. To be sure, this belief was based partly on the
more democratic nature of post-Revolutionary state governments-
their provisions for direct election of officials and rotation in office,
for example-but it was based as well on an understanding of the
implications of physical proximity. By being more immediately at
hand than federal officials, state officials were thought to be both
more knowledgeable about local conditions and policy preferences,
and more available to constituents seeking government action.70
Second, it is easy to see how constitutional mechanisms of
popular control might not only fail to cure the problem of excessive
state responsiveness, but worsen it. If state governments are more
susceptible to faction, democratic controls are hardly the answer since
the general public is likely to be, if anything, even more susceptible to
factional passions than a republican institution of government such as
a legislature. This belief is a foundational assumption not only of the
American constitutional preference for republican government over
pure democracy, but also of that quintessentially countermajoritarian
mechanism, the Bill of Rights.
If constitutional mechanisms of direct democracy increase
governmental responsiveness to factions, one might say in response
that such mechanisms at least increase the likelihood that state
governments will respond to factions consisting of a democratic
majority instead of narrower special interests, but this will hardly do.
In the first place, both kinds of factions by definition pursue their own
self-interest at the expense of the common good, and majority factions
are said to be worse because they can actually carry out their plans.7'
separation of powers was misplaced: in their view, the national government had been
captured by very narrow but extremely powerful special interests. See, e.g., DE WIT,
supra note 61, ch. 8.
70. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 66, at 81.
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 66, at 80.
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In the second place, even assuming, contrary to Madison, that
majority faction is preferable to minority faction, there is no good
reason to suppose that state governance decisions made through
mechanisms providing for substantial, direct popular involvement will
be any more likely than are republican mechanisms of indirect
democracy to reflect the will of a broad-based majority-even one
that could be deemed a faction.
B. The Inevitability of Governmental Responsiveness to Factions
Political scientists who study the electorate have provided
considerable evidence to support the conclusion that states are more
responsive than the federal government to narrow, minority factions.
For decades, studies have shown that the American electorate is by
and large apathetic and uninformed." These characteristics manifest
themselves not only in generally low levels of voter turnout in national
elections,73 but also in the American electorate's lack of political
sophistication. In the words of one commentator, "[t]he typical
American voter.., knows little about politics, is not interested in
politics, does not participate in politics, does not organize his or her
political attitudes in a coherent manner, and does not think in
structured, ideological terms.
7 4
Other studies, however, show that the electorate's general
tendencies become more pronounced the more local the election. As
low as turnout may be in elections to federal office, it is even lower for
state elections, and lower still for local elections.75 If Americans are
apathetic in general, they care even less about state politics than
national politics, and are less well informed about issues confronting
the state.76 According to one study, for example, fewer than one-third
72. The classic study in the field is ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN
VOTER (1960).
73. See generally WARREN E. MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW
AMERICAN VOTER 39-69 (1996); RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN
VOTER (1992).
74. ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 1-2 (1989).
75. See, e.g., LESTER W. MILBRATH, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: HOW AND WHY
DO PEOPLE GET INVOLVED IN POLITICS? 104 (1965); TEIXEIRA, supra note 73, at 6;
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 397 (1990).
76. See, e.g., DAVID R. BERMAN, STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 14 (4th ed. 1984);
MORRIS J. LEVITT & ELEANOR G. FELDBAUM, OF, BY AND FOR THE PEOPLE: STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 88 (1980). Regarding the local level, see, e.g.,
HARVEY J. TUCKER & L. HARMON ZEIGLER, PROFESSIONALS VERSUS THE PUBLIC:
ATTITUDES, COMMUNICATION, AND RESPONSE IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS 230 (1980).
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of the public knows "what is happening in their state governments.",71
In another study that asked voters to rank their attentiveness to
international, national, state and local affairs, only 17% said they were
most attentive to state affairs."
Clearly, the less citizens know and care about some political
arena, and the less they participate in political decision making in that
arena, the easier it will be for highly motivated or well-financed
narrow special interest groups to exercise a disproportionate impact
on the relevant political outcomes. This danger to broad-based
democratic responsiveness at the state level is only exacerbated by the
fact that state governments generally offer more opportunities for
political corruption than does the federal government. First, political
power is typically more dispersed on the state level. Unlike the
federal executive branch, which is entirely centralized and under the
direction of a single official, state executive branches are typically
pluralistic, containing multiple power centers clustered around
independently elected officials with distinct spheres of influence.
Each of these power centers represents a separate arena in which an
interest group may compete for influence. Second, state power is far
greater in extent than federal power, at least in theory.79 Unlike
federal power, which is limited and enumerated, state power is
general and extends to every conceivable subject of governance. 80 It
follows, in theory at least, that the activities of state government will
be of interest to a greater number of groups, thus making it a more
active arena for interest group contests. Finally, Oress oversight,
which has proved an invaluable check against government corruption
on the federal level, is virtually absent at the state level .
These observations are borne out by studies of initiatives in states
that permit them. Intended originally as a way for the people to
77. LEVITI & FELDBAUM, supra note 76, at 88.
78. M. Kent Jennings & Harmon Zeigler, The Salience of American State Politics, 64
AM. POL' Sci. REv. 523, 525 (1970).
79. I say "in theory" because it sometimes seems as though the scope of
congressional power has expanded almost to the limits of state power. Perhaps the Court's
recent decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 98 (1997), foreshadow a move to reassert the traditional relationship.
80. The classic statement of this proposition is Walter F. Dodd, The Function of a
State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 205 (1915). Court decisions to this effect are far too
numerous to list. For one recent example, see Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d
847, 849 (Ill. 1979) (explaining that because "the basic sovereign power of the State resides
in the legislature... there is no need to grant power to the legislature").
81. See generally Charles Layton & Mary Walton, Missing the Story at the Statehouse,
20 AM. JOURNALISM REVIEW 42 (1998); Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation:
Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REv. 825, 843-44 (1996).
1999]
So UTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
bypass state legislatures perceived as beholden to powerful special
interests by acting directly to achieve the common good, initiatives
and referenda have fallen well short of their proponents' ambitious
goals. Ballot propositions are often lengthy and complex, and use
technical or legal jargon unfamiliar to voters.8 According to one
study, comprehension of ballot propositions typically requires a
college or graduate education, an educational level attained by less
than twenty percent of the populace.83 The result is that voters are
frequently confused about the meaning of the ballot measures on
which they are asked to vote, ' sometimes to the point of voting
against the very positions they wish to take. 5
Widespread voter confusion not only undermines the ability of
initiatives and referenda to respond to the popular will by obscuring
it, but also makes these instrumentalities of direct democracy
particularly susceptible to exploitation by well-financed special
interests." Today, the typical initiative campaign pits "a poorly
funded grass roots coalition" against "a corporate-backed
organization with significant financial resources."'  In Oregon, for
example, the energy, tobacco and trucking industries have funnelled
millions into blocking proposed limitations on nuclear power, smoking
in public places and unsafe trucking practices." Furthermore; the
complexity of ballot issues and the efforts voters must undertake to
inform themselves skew voter turnout on ballot propositions in favor
of better educated, more affluent and older voters," a group far from
82. See Jane S. Schachter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in
Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 127-29, 136-37 (1995).
83. See DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 118-19 (1984).
84. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 208-09 (1989); Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman,
"And to the Republic for Which It Stands": Guaranteeing a Republican Form of
Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1057, 1064-66 (1996).
85. See Schachter, supra note 82, at 140 n.140 (citing PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD F.
FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
125-33 (1992)).
86. See BETrY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT
ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 139-60 (1987).
87. Robyn Polashuk, Protecting the Public Debate: The Validity of the Fairness
Doctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 391, 404-05 (1993).
88. See Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of the People to Make Fools
of Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and Referendum, A Local Government
Perspective, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 47, 85 (1995).
89. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 33-34 (1995).
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representative of the general population.9 In light of these
developments, it seems impossible to claim that mechanisms of direct
democracy provide a vehicle by which popular majorities may
circumvent state legislatures dominated by narrow factions. If
anything, direct democratic control seems only to supply another
route by which narrow factions may use governmental institutions to
advance their own self-interest at the expense of the common good.
C. The Paradox of Democratic Unresponsiveness
I have argued thus far that the greater tendency of state
constitutions to provide mechanisms for the exercise of tighter
democratic control over government reflects an underlying belief that
state officials cannot be as thoroughly trusted as federal officials to
pursue the common good. I have suggested that this approach is fully
consistent with Madisonian assumptions about republican government
on the state and federal levels, but also that the kinds of apparently
more democratic mechanisms to which states have resorted are
unlikely to alleviate the problem. This difficulty forces us to confront
a much more damaging and potentially far-reaching critique that some
political scientists have made of the concept of democratic
responsiveness itself.
Political scientists have long argued that democratic governments
are not responsive to "the popular will" as such. Rather, they are
responsive only to "activists"-that is, to members of the political
community who communicate their preferences to government
officials.9 Citizens can communicate their preferences in a wide
variety of ways. In a recent major study, Sidney Verba and his
colleagues include in their definition of activism anything from low-
involvement activities like voting, to affiliation with a political
organization, contacting government officials, attending meetings of
political organizations, and making campaign contributions, all the
90. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
91. See generally SIDNEY VERBA, ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICA (Harvard 1995); L. HARMON ZEIGLER & HARVEY J.
TUCKER, THE QUEST FOR RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATE
AND LOCAL POLITICS (Duxbury Press 1978). I set aside here a potentially even more
potent critique of the notion of responsiveness to the popular will based on Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem and public choice theory. For an overview, see generally Richard
H. Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990). For a concise
and insightful comparison of the pluralism and public choice critiques of democracy, see
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 1-29 (1997).
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way up to intensely involving activities like paid political lobbying.'
Whatever the method, though, the underlying point is the same:
governments respond to activism because it is the only thing they can
respond to-it is the only stimulus they receive.
This relationship would hardly be worth mentioning were it not
for the fact that activists are rarely representative of the general
public, nor are their views and positions often typical. In fact, activists
tend to be, in the terminology of political science, "elites"-people
who are better educated and better off both socially and financially
than the general public.93 The differences between activists and the
general public mean that the messages typically communicated to
government decision makers tend to differ from the messages that
would be communicated by a more representative group of
intermediaries, and these messages tend to be communicated in a
more systematic way. As Verba puts it, "[t]hose whose preferences
and needs become visible to policy makers through their activity are
unrepresentative of those who are more quiescent in ways that are of
great political significance: although similar in their attitudes, they
differ in their personal circumstances and dependence upon
government benefits, in their priorities for government action, and in
what they say when they get involved."94
The unrepresentativeness of political activists presents a
disturbing paradox. If to be responsive is necessarily to respond to the
wishes of a small, elite, unrepresentative segment of the populace,
then the only way for a government to be genuinely responsive to the
wishes of its constituents is to refrain from responding to their
expressions of those wishes-to be, in a word, unresponsive. Indeed,
a government committed to such a course would be for all intents and
purposes completely unresponsive since it would by hypothesis refuse
to respond to the only kinds of stimuli that citizens are capable of
producing. Yet such an approach would hardly differ in principle from
a Burkean government whose members deliberated abstractly on the
common good and ruled out consideration of any communications
from constituents on the ground that such communications are by
definition a kind of unrepresentative special pleading.95 Thus, the
more responsive a government tries to be, the less responsive it is
92. See VERBA, supra note 91, chs. 2-3.
93. See id. at chs. 4-7.
94. Id. at 227.




capable of being, and vice versa.96
These findings, if correct, are highly troubling for they entirely
collapse the difference between responsive and unresponsive
government. Or, put another way, they suggest that the search for
democratically responsive government is a fool's errand because no
form of government, even the most democratic, is responsive; all are
unresponsive, each in its own way. And this is a notion that calls into
question the workability, indeed the very possibility, of democracy
itself.
IV. SOME POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS
Must we then abandon our aspirations for democratically
responsive government? I want to touch briefly on three possible
responses to the paradox of democratic unresponsiveness set out
above.
The easiest, and perhaps the least satisfying response to this
problem is to dissolve it by redefining democracy in pluralist terms.
This is the solution that most political scientists seem to prefer.
Harmon Zeigler, to cite one prominent example, suggests the
following way of reformulating the question of whether state
governments are more responsive than the federal government. In his
seminal study of interest group politics, Zeigler argues that federalism
should not be understood as a struggle between nation and state but
as a struggle "among interests who have favorable access to one of the
two levels of government. '  According to this view, the key feature
of federalism is not that state governments are more responsive to the
popular will than the federal government, but that different kinds of
factions, organized differently or commanding different kinds of
resources, are better equipped to exert influence in one forum than
another. Thus, shifting power to the state level is unlikely to enhance
the responsiveness of government to the popular will, but is very
likely to alter the mix of special interests capable of evoking favorable
governmental action.
96. Jim Rossi has described a similar paradox involving a tradeoff between
participation and deliberation in the area of administrative governance. Devices that are
designed to increase public participation in governmental decision making, and thereby to
enhance governmental responsiveness, may actually thwart responsiveness by reducing the
quality of decisions or by so increasing the burden involved in making decisions as to drive
agencies away from modes of action in which public participation is required. See Jim
Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency
Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173,211-41 (1997).
97. HARMON ZEIGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 48 (1964).
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By analogy, the same may be said of the state constitutional
predeliction toward mechanisms of popular democratic control. On
this view, contrary to the beliefs of the Progressives, democratically
oriented reform measures like initiatives, referenda, term limits and
independently elected executive branch officials are no more likely
than the federal model of republican government to produce decisions
genuinely responsive to the popular will. They are, however, likely to
make the government responsive to a different set of unrepresentative
special interests-namely, those that for reasons of organization or
resources are better suited to get their way in an initiative fight, say,
than in a legislative one.
While this approach restores the possibility of democracy, it does
so at considerable cost, for it requires abandoning any aspirations for
government that is truly responsive to the majority will, public-
regarding, and, in consequence, substantively good. In its place,
pluralism offers a Schumpeterian clash of self-interested factions, a
morally shallow kind of governance of doubtful legitimacy in a society
like ours. Certainly to embrace such a political system requires
abandoning the vision of the nation's founders who, although they
conceded the possibility of self-interested behavior and took pains to
guard against its effects, hoped nonetheless that virtuous self-
government for the common good would be the norm.98 This kind of
pluralism, moreover, is even further from the vision of the
Progressives, who believed fervently in the virtue and public spirit of
the ordinary citizen.'
A more measured kind of response to the problem of democratic
unresponsiveness might be to accept it as an unfortunate social fact
and attempt to deal with it by limiting its worst effects. This approach
would recognize citizen apathy and the dominance of narrow special
interests as inescapable facts of life in a large modern democracy and,
much as the Framers did two centuries ago, attempt to structure
institutions of governance so as to impede the ability of such factions
to use governmental power for their own narrow purposes. Unlike
the Progressives, however, this approach suggests a solution not in
institutions of democratic control, which seem only to exacerbate the
problems of factional dominance, but in institutions that make
government even less responsive than it is now. Thus, we might turn
to a governance structure like Calhoun's system of concurrent
98. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 18, at 82--84.
99. Hofstadter calls the idealized Progressive citizen the "Man of Good Will."
HOFSTADTER, supra note 60, at 260-61.
[Vol. 40:759
DEMOCRATIC UNRESPONSIVENESS
majorities, in which the power to veto proposed governmental action
is far more widely distributed than it is today."W Some of the recent
theoretical work on deliberative democracy strikes me as moving in
that direction.'01
One of the great problems with such an approach, however, is
that it impedes the ability of government to take any action at all, not
merely those actions which are sought by and for the sake of a selfish
minority faction. Such a system would tend to entrench the status
quo, which might only create further problems if the status quo is in
some way unjust."° If the history of American governance has really
been the kind of history of special interest dominance suggested by
political scientists, then the status quo is virtually guaranteed to be
biased against the common good and in favor of the most recently
dominant selfish factions. Thus, merely disabling government from
changing the present status quo without simultaneously reconsidering
its substance would likely only constitutionalize and entrench the very
gains that under this approach are deemed by hypothesis to be
illegitimate. 3
A third possible response to the problem of democratic
unresponsiveness would be to reaffirm contemporary aspirations for
democratically responsive self-government, acknowledge the failure
of present institutions to achieve it, and simply go back to the
constitutional drawing board for another try. Before doing so,
however, it might be worth reflecting on a key assumption underlying
this strategy: the assumption that institutional design, implemented
through perspicacious constitutional drafting, can have a significant
impact on the outcomes of a society's politics. Perhaps if the Framers
of the United States Constitution erred, it was neither in their political
philosophy nor in their analysis of the politics of their day, but in their
belief that constitutional craftsmanship alone could counteract a
society's political shortcomings.
A few judges have occasionally expressed such sentiments.
Justice Jackson, for example, once observed that the formal
100. See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (C. Gordon Post
ed., 1953).
101. See James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative Democracy
and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421,443-46 (1996).
102. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).
103. Of course this might be nothing new. As Bob Williams has observed,
constitutionalization has often been used in state politics to preserve what might otherwise
be transient political gains on the legislative level. See Robert F. Williams, State
Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 175 (1983).
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separation of constitutional powers could not "keep power in the
hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its
problems... [;] only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers."1° Judge Hand expressed a similar sentiment in
his well-known comment that "[a] society so riven that the spirit of
moderation is gone, no court can save; [and] a society where that
spirit flourishes, no court need save ... ."' Political scientists have
often said much the same thing. For example, in characteristically
blunt terms, E.E. Schattschneider has argued that political parties are
capable of subverting the best-considered legal norms:
The political parties are able to compel public officers to behave
in ways that the law does not contemplate, by methods of which
the law is ignorant, without in any way affecting the validity of
their official acts. What goes on behind the formal act, the
official seals, and public documents the law refuses to know.
Since the parties operate in a legal no man's land they are able
to produce startling effects: in effect, they may empty an office
of its contents, transfer the authority of one magistrate to
another magistrate, or to persons unknown to the constitution
and laws of the land. It follows that though politicians may
know something about the law, it is completely unnecessary for
a lawyer to know anything about politics. ....
If Schattschneider is right, questions of legal and constitutional
design may simply be of little relevance to the problems to which they
are addressed. The means by which politics are conducted and the
outcomes of political processes may well be beyond the ability of the
law, no matter how well-intentioned, to affect in any significant way.
And if this is the case, then the only approach capable of succeeding
may well be the kind of civic renewal through education and
individual participation urged by some contemporary civic republican
theorists."° The focus, that is, must be on the individual rather than
the institution.
104. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
105. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155, 164 (I. Dillard ed., 1960).
106. E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 12 (1942).
107. See generally BENJAMIN BARBER, AN ARISTOCRACY OF EVERYONE: THE
POLITICS OF EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (1992); BENJAMIN R. BARBER,




All American constitutions seek to thwart the ability of narrow
factions to seize governmental power for the purpose of pursuing their
own self-interest at the expense of the common good, yet they do so in
different ways. The federal Constitution attempts to prevent factional
dominance by impairing popular control over government, the state
constitutions by enhancing popular control through mechanisms like
initiatives, referenda, rotation in office, recall, and the like. Yet both
approaches share two key assumptions: that there is an objectively
knowable common good, and that officials are less likely to pursue the
common good in a comparatively small, state polity than they are in a
comparatively large, national one.
Yet the turn, on the state level, to enhanced popular control has
not eliminated factional dominance of state politics, and may well
have enhanced it. Worse still, as political scientists have shown, the
search for institutional solutions on the constitutional level to the
problem of democratic unresponsiveness may well be futile.
According to the paradox of democratic unresponsiveness, democratic
governments may be incapable of responding to anything other than
the narrow interests of self-selected political activists whose views and
interests are unrepresentative of those of a genuinely broad-based
majority of the polity.
Moreover, none of the ways out of this conundrum seems
especially attractive: each requires abandoning to some degree either
our aspirations for substantively just self-rule for the good of all or our
faith in the technocratic belief that conscientious constitutional design
is an effective tool for the control of social and political problems.
Ultimately, the solution to the problem of factional tyranny and
governmental malfeasance may lie only in the development of cultural
values that must be inculcated on and carried forth at the individual
level, not institutionally, but one citizen at a time.
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